Abstract: Experimental philosophy is a new approach to philosophy that incorporates the experimental methodologies of psychology, behavioral economics, and sociology. Experimental philosophers generally maintain that, in addition to traditional philosophical practices, these ways of gathering evidence can be instrumental in shedding light on philosophically important issues. Rather than relying on their own intuitions about specic cases, experimental philosophers perform systematic experiments to determine what intuitions people have about those cases. These intuitions are then used as evidence. In this context, four main approaches to experimental philosophy are introduced, a sample of experimental philosophy's results is oered, and some of the philosophical importance of those results is explained.
Motivating Experimental Philosophy
Experimental philosophy is an important departure from traditional 20 th century analytic philosophical practice. To a large extent, traditional twentieth century analytic philosophy has been conducted from the armchair. Many philosophers think that most of the evidence required for constructing conceptual analyses and philosophical theories is available via prolonged reection.
1 For example, often philosophers propose an analysis of a concept and then other philosophers try to construct counterexamples to that conceptual analysis. Often these counterexamples take the form of hypothetical thought experiments. Intuitions generated by these counterexamples are meant to suggest that the analysis is wrong or in need of renement. As a result, conceptual analyses are typically thought to be better to the extent they can withstand intuitive counterexamples.
2
For instance, take one of Gettier's (1963) counterexamples to the`Justied
True Belief ' analysis of knowledge. The`Justied True Belief ' analysis of knowledge holds that the following conditions are individually necessary and jointly sucient for a subject (S) to know a proposition P : (a) P is true; (b) S believes that P ; and (c) S is justied in believing that P . Gettier claims that he can construct a case where it is obvious that (a)(c) are present and yet we do not think S knows. Suppose Smith has good evidence for the following proposition:
Jones will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Smith can then validly infer the following proposition: (d) the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. However, Smith is the man who will get the job, and Smith has ten coins in his pocket, but Smith does not know either of these two facts. It
seems' that (a)(c) are satised in this example: (d) is true; Smith believes (d); and Smith is justied in believing that (d). It also seems that Smith does not know (d) because there is an unacceptable element of luck involved making (d)
true (Gettier 1963) . Hence, the Justied True Belief account is a failed analysis of knowledge because in Gettier's example it`seems' (a)(c) are satised and it seems' to us that Smith does not know (d). Roughly, these kinds of intellectual seemings are intuitions.
3 One has the intuition that (a)(c) are met while at the same time one has the intuition that Smith does not know (d). Thus, intuitions are irreplaceable in testing counterexamples to an analysis of a concept.
As Gettier's counterexample to the`Justied True Belief ' account of knowledge illustrates, philosophical theories and conceptual analyses are at least in part tested by intuitions generated by hypothetical thought experiments. Alexander and Weinberg (2007) call this general methodology the practice of philosophy. In this practice, philosophers' intuitions play a critical role. But many philosophers do not think they are merely using their own idiosyncratic intuitions. Rather, philosophers often act as if their intuitions are widely held. For example, Frank
Jackson has claimed that often we know that our own case is typical and so can generalize from it to others (Jackson 1998, 37) .
4
2 One popular method philosophers use to generate theories and conceptual analyses is reective equilibrium (Daniels 1979; Goldman1986) . This process counsels that one should develop one's theory or conceptual analysis by a process of mutually adjusting it with deeply and widely held intuitions. A principle or theory is rejected if it licenses an inference that one is not willing to accept. An intuition is rejected if it violates a principle that one is not willing to discard. By such a process of mutual adjustment, it is often maintained that progress can be made.
3 There is no consensus in philosophy about what intuitions are. Some think intuitions are simply beliefs (Lewis 1983) , some think they are inclinations to believe (van Inwagen 1997) , some think they are immediate seemings (Goldman/Pust 1998) , and for others they are seemings with some sort of special aura (Claxton 1998) . For a more extensive review, see Feltz/Bishop, in press. 4 See Alexander/Weinberg 2007 for a thorough discussion of the dierent views about who the`we' refers to.
Experimental philosophers are skeptical of such claims. Experimental philosophers normally hold that philosophers are not very good at knowing from the armchair (a) which intuitions are widely shared, (b) that their intuitions are representative of the folk, and (c) the biases to which their intuitions may be susceptible. Because of these concerns, experimental philosophers are suspicious that the current philosophical practice is the best way to generate philosophical theories or conceptual analyses. In the next section, some basic projects of experimental philosophy that support (a)(c) are presented.
Experimental Philosophy's Many Faces

The Descriptive Pro ject
Generally, the descriptive project consists of describing and measuring folk intuitions, concepts, and the cognitive processes involved in philosophically relevant intuitions.
5 Mapping out philosophically relevant intuitions, concepts, and cognitive processes is necessary to substantiate some claims made by philosophers. 
Evidence From the Descriptive Project
Experimental philosophers have gathered data in areas as diverse as action theory, 6 ethics, 7 metaphysics, 8 philosophy of science, 9 philosophy of mind, 10 and epis- 5 The descriptive, prescriptive, and normative projects in experimental philosophy were rst identied by Nichols 2006. The current discussion is an adaptation of those three projects. For other descriptions of the projects in experimental philosophy, see Nadelhoer/Nahmias 2007; but see also Baron 2008 . 6 Cokely /Feltz 2009a; Knobe 2003a; 2003b; Knobe/Burra 2006; Machery 2008; McCann 2005; Mele 2003; Nadelhoer 2004; 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; Nichols/Ulatowski 2007. 7 Feltz /Cokely 2008; Goodwin/Darley 2008; Haidt/Koller/Dias 1993; Nadelhoer/Feltz 2008; Nichols 2002; 2004c; Nichols/Folds-Bennett 2003 
Intentional Action
One prominent part of action theory attempts to understand intentional action (Mele 1992 (Bratman 1984) . The Simple View predicts that most people would not consider side eects to be brought about intentionally whereas the Single Phenomenon View allows for some side eects to be brought about intentionally. Sure enough, the environment was harmed [helped] . (Knobe 2003a, 191) Participants were asked if the chairman intentionally harmed/helped the environment. In the harm condition, 82% thought the chairman harmed the environment intentionally. In the help condition, 77% thought that the chairman did not help the environment intentionally (Knobe 2003a, 192) . These results have been replicated across a wide range of cases (Cushman/Mele 2008; Knobe 2003b; Mele/Cushman 2007; Nichols/Ulatowski 2007) , ages (Leslie/Knobe/Cohen 2006) , and cultures (Knobe/Burra 2006 /Mele 2008. that the moral valence of a side eect would inuence people's intentionality judgments about the side eect (Mele 2001) . Similarly, McCann's defense of the Simple View as an analysis of the folk concept also seems to fail (Nadelhoer 2006c ). These general results indicate that armchair speculation alone is not the best way to predict folk intuitions about intentional action. Hence, obtaining a clear and accurate understanding of folk intuitions often requires engaging in empirical work.
Free Will
One of the major controversies in the contemporary free will debate is between those who think that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with the truth of determinism (compatibilists) and those who do not (incompatibilists).
The theoretical terrain of this particular debate is very dicult and nuanced. According to some experimental philosophers, armchair philosophy is not the best way to decide which position best captures the folk view about free will and moral responsibility. Rather, the best way to determine the folk view is to run systematic experiments on the folk. In some of the rst studies exploring folk intuitions about determinism's relation to free will and moral responsibility, Nahmias/Morris /Nadelhoer/Turner (2004; found that the folk sometimes respond as if they had compatibilist intuitions. In one experiment, Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoer, and Turner gave participants the following description of an agent in a deterministic universe: Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, starting from the exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature. In this universe the same conditions and the same laws of nature produce the exact same outcomes, so that every single time the universe is re-created, everything must happen the exact same way. For instance, in this universe a person named Jill decides to steal a necklace at a particular time, and every time the universe is re-created, Jill decides to steal the necklace at that time. in press) to name just a few. Roughly, these individual dierences fall into dierences in specic intuitions, cross-cultural dierences, and dierences related to traits (e.g., personality). 15 These individual dierences make a more complicated, rich, and accurate picture of the folk's philosophically relevant intuitions.
Third, there are also some cross-cultural dierences in philosophically relevant intuitions. For example, there are dierences in East Asians' and Wes-13 There are also dierences related to age, see Nichols/Folds-Bennett 2003 and Nichols 2004b. 14 For similar diversity of intuitions about free will and moral responsibility, see Feltz/Cokely/Nadelhoer 2009. 15 Surprisingly, there is no current evidence that there are large cross-cultural dierences in people's conception of free will and moral responsibly (Sarkissian et al., in press) or judgments about side eects (Knobe/Burra 2006) . Finally, it appears that all philosophers shoulder at least some burden of explaining why some groups of people have mistaken intuitions (e.g., they must provide an error theory). Hence, some popular burden shifting maneuvers (Nah- Hence, philosophers who have a view supported by the`majority' of intuitions still have some responsibility to explain away contrary intuitions when there are systematic dierences (e.g., Nahmias/Murray, in press).
The Prescriptive Pro ject
The prescriptive project involves bridging the normative and descriptive projects to give prescriptions about what intuitions we ought to have. The prescriptive project can also help construct environments that encourage desirable intuitions (or how we can design environments to illicit more stable or accurate intuitions and judgments, as in law). The prescriptive project is independent of the normative project because even if some folk intuitions are false, it does not follow that we ought to jettison those false intuitions. Nichols (2006) argues we may not want to correct false intuitions because the practices or institutions that are underwritten by those intuitions may be too valuable to discard. Of course, just because we may not always want to correct false folk intuitions does not mean that we never would want to correct false folk intuitions. A couple of examples will suce to illustrate when we may and may not want to correct folk intuitions.
Assume that Nahmias et al.'s (2006) results are correct and indicate that the folk are compatibilists. An intriguing set of studies performed by Vohs and Schooler (2008) suggests that encouraging participants to believe that determinism is true increased undesirable behaviors like cheating on a test. Vohs and Schooler speculate that making a lack of control salient to participants is one plausible mechanism that increased these undesirable behaviors. Many compatibilists take control to be an important part of free action and moral responsibility. If encouraging a belief in determinism makes a lack of control more salient, then participants may think they do not have the right kind of control over their actions to be free and morally responsible. 
Whether one brings about an action knowingly or
intentionally is important to determine the severity of the crime a person has committed and what punishment is warranted. According to Nadelhoer, these ndings suggest that just being accused of a heinous crime increases the chances that a person is judged to commit the crime knowingly and intentionally compared to a less heinous crime. But the severity of the crime should not inuence people's judgments about one's mental states (e.g., knowing)but it does. If these judgments are illegitimately inuenced by moral considerations, then in these contexts we may want to change people's intuitions.
The Adaptive Perspective
The adaptive perspective attempts to determine what purposes people's philosophically relevant intuitions might serve, situating this understanding in an ecology. Whereas the other projectsthe descriptive, normative, and prescriptive have placed considerable emphasis on internal mechanisms, processes, and reliability of intuitions, the adaptive project shifts the focus to emphasize the interplay between people, processes, and environments. For example, one can ask why and how intuitions developed, when such intuitions would be benecial, and for whom. The adaptive perspective is a necessary extension and natural compliment to the other three projects. If the normative project tells us what 17 See Nahmias/Coates/Kvaran 2007 and Nahmias/Murray, in press, for a more detailed discussion and empirical evidence regarding determinism being interpreted as bypassing agent's mental states.
18 For other possible sources of worry, see Viney/Waldman/Barchilon 1982 for evidence that those who believe determinism is true are more punitive.
19 That people make dierent judgments about whether a person knows that a good or bad side eect will be brought about is called the epistemic side eect. For more research about the epistemic side eect, see Beebe/Buckwalter, in press. intuitions the folk should have, the adaptive project helps us bridge the descriptive and normative gap providing prescriptions for the design of decision making environments based on the t between goals, decision makers, and decision tasks.
Mounting evidence suggests that philosophically relevant intuitions are multiply determined by a variety of factors including personality (Feltz/Cokely 2009 Apart from the theoretical importance of the adaptive perspective, there are several important practical implications. Understanding why these intuitions come about can help us understand how we can go about altering decisionmaking environments so that those naturally occurring processes achieve more optimal or socially desirable results. For example, there is some evidence that if one is more optimistic, one is less likely to endorse specic euthanasia practices compared to somebody who is not very optimistic (Feltz/Cokely, unpublished data) . In many circumstances, optimism (or pessimism) may be valuable general outlooks to have. But when one is making serious end of life decisions, it seems that one would want to make better decisions (suitably dened).
20 One intriguing idea is to design the environment so that there is a greater chance that the person will make a better decision about end of life care. Understanding and controlling for these individual dierences can play an important role in designing those environments.
We can see that an accurate descriptive understanding of philosophically relevant intuitions is essential for the normative and prescriptive project and that an accurate descriptive understanding must take into account the adaptive perspective. Indeed, overwhelming data show that judgment is a function of person, process, and environment (Gigerenzer 2000) . We need to know what intuitions the folk have (and why and when) before we can use them to help settle normative disputes and before we can understand what intuitions we would want to keep or revise. 20 There is some reason to believe that those who are optimistic have a somewhat unrealistic view of the world (Wenglert/Rosen 2000) . This unrealistic view may inuence their estimation of the chances of recovery for somebody who is terminally ill or in a coma.
Challenges and Opportunities
Experimental philosophy has not gone without challenge. The present section details two popular challenges to experimental philosophy: the expertise defense and the verbal defense.
21 Both of these challenges pose unique opportunities for experimental philosophy.
The Expertise Defense
One of the most common objections to experimental philosophy is that the subjects of the experiments are the wrong class of people (Ludwig 2007) . A natural question to ask is whose intuitions are we supposed to use as evidence in constructing philosophical theories or conceptual analyses? Alexander and Weinberg (2007) Why not intuition elitism? One worry is that when we deal only with philosophers' intuitions, we run the risk of having nothing more than a`philosophical ction' as our subject matter (Mele 2001) . Indeed, many philosophers take themselves to be exploring real world phenomena reected in wide-spread intuitions and not only the intuitions of a relatively small group of people (i.e., philosophers). As Alexander and Weinberg (2007) argue, philosopher's intuitions may not be representative of most people's intuitions and may not be of a higher quality than folk intuitions. Given these worries, Alexander and Weinberg propose three challenges for the proponent of intuition elitism: (1) nd evidence that there are dierences between folk and philosophers' intuitions; (2) demonstrate the dierences found in (1) are philosophically relevant; and (3) demonstrate that there are no relevant dierences among philosophers' intuitions. One must provide evidence that 13 are true and not merely that 13 might be true. Otherwise we have no reason to think that philosophers' intuitions are any better than folk intuitions and intuition elitism fails. Intuition populism is the only other alternative lest intuitions should not play a role at all in philosophical theories or conceptual analyses.
Can challenges 13 be met? Each one of these challenges constitutes a separate and interesting research project. Indeed, there is already evidence that (1) is true. Those who have some philosophical training seem to exhibit a more reective cognitive style (Cokely/Feltz 2009b; Livengood/Sytsma/Feltz/Scheines/ Machery, in press ). Moreover, Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) found that the number of philosophy classes one has taken can inuence some philosophically 21 For additional criticisms, see Kauppinen 2007. relevant intuitions. It looks likely that philosophers' intuitions can be dierent from folk intuitions, so the rst challenge appears to have been partially met.
But (2) and (3) are either too strong or in need of renement. Let's take (3) rst. This challenge is too strong because it is neither reasonable to expect that all philosophers have the same intuitions regarding a particular case nor can they be expected to bring all of the same information to the table. Expertise is domain specic. That means that some philosophers will be roughly equivalent to the folk in many areas. For example, it would not be reasonable to expect a philosopher who specializes in bioethics to have the same deep and intricate understanding of intentional action as someone who specializes in action theory.
In this case, the bioethicist would in many respects fall into the same category as the folk. Hence, it's not reasonable to require that all philosophers have the same intuitions.
So, there must be some suitably dened proper subset of philosophers. But how does one set the proper boundaries? Certainly using philosophers in general is too crude, but we do not want to cut so thin that we are left with intuition solipsism. Finding a principled way to distinguish something between intuition solipsism and an overly broad view of intuition elitism proposes to be a very dicult challenge. But once these dicult theoretical questions are settled, determining if those suitably dened philosophers have dierent intuitions is an empirical question that warrants exploration. Of course, as Alexander and Weinberg note, substantiating 13 is ultimately an empirical endeavor. Given the current state of the evidence, one cannot say with conviction that their challenges have been met. Descriptively, it is still an open (but rapidly closing) question whether expertise makes the right kind of dierence to deect worries that philosophers' intuitions are just as diverse and unreliable as folk intuitions. More studies need to be conducted. These could be longitudinal studies that track philosophers over time or they could be cross-sectional studies that look at individuals with dierent levels of education (Livengood et al., in press ).
The Verbal Defense
The verbal defense claims that the intuitions elicited by some experimental phi- 
Additional Opportunities
With an accurate descriptive account of folk intuitions, there are a number of philosophically important applications of the prescriptive, normative, and adaptive projects. Just to give one example, take the individual dierences approach to philosophically relevant intuitions. The individual dierences approach to philosophically relevant intuitions holds that many intuitions are predictably fragmented. This fragmentation has several practical payos. Philosophically relevant intuitions are important for an array of real world applications and decisions. As mentioned, people's intentionality judgments are important for court cases. But some people's intuitions may be illegitimately biased by the emotions that are generated by the behavior. If we can identify the group of people who are likely to be biased in these ways, then we may be able to de-bias those people or not select them for some court cases. The result may be more uniform and accurate judgments about court cases. Along these lines, the individual dierences approach to philosophically relevant intuitions could have implications for law (e.g., jury instruction and selection), applied ethics (e.g., informed consent), politics (e.g., voting patterns and decisions), among others. One goal would be to map out these environments and individual dierences, the implications of indi-vidual dierences in these environments, and then prescribe contexts that take advantage of those judgment processes.
Conclusion
In this review, there were three main goals. The rst oers a clear explanation what experimental philosophy is. The second sketches the varied projects and perspectives that exist within experimental philosophy and why they are important. The last details some of the main challenges and opportunities for experimental philosophy. In the end, experimental philosophy has become an established and credible approach to philosophical problemsan approach that will uncover many more interesting phenomena that challenge and supplement traditional analytic philosophy. Real progress will require courageous researchers to develop elegant solutions to the current obstacles and debates. Only then will we increase our understanding of what it is to be rational, ethical, human, and to create a better world. 
